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Abstract
The monetary authority loses the ability to implement the Taylor Rule at the
zero lower bound. However, the promise to implement a Taylor Rule upon exit
remains an e¤ective policy instrument. We show that a Taylor Rule, with an
optimally-chosen exit date and time varying ination target, delivers fully opti-
mal policy at the ZLB. Additionally, a Taylor Rule with only an optimally chosen
exit date but a zero ination target delivers almost all the welfare gains of optimal
policy and is simpler to communicate.
JEL Classication: E5, E52
Keywords: New-Keynesian Model, Ination Target, Optimal Monetary Policy,
Zero Lower Bound
The authors would like to thank the co-editor of the journal, Pierpaolo Benigno, two anonymous
referees, Klaus Adam, Carl Walsh and seminar participants at Ryerson University, University of California
- Santa Cruz, Louisiana State University and the National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, New
Delhi, India for helpful comments on earlier versions of the paper.
1 Introduction
Once the nominal interest rate reaches the zero lower bound (ZLB), monetary policy
looses the ability to stimulate the economy by further reducing the nominal interest rate.
Yet, the monetary authority retains the ability to stimulate by promising a path for
future interest rates which can raise expected ination, thereby reducing the current real
interest rate. Conventional monetary policy, dened as setting current and future short-
term interest rates, retains a role at the ZLB when the monetary authority is willing to
announce "forward guidance" for short-term rates.
In the standard New Keynesian model, monetary policy is characterized by a Taylor
Rule, whereby the nominal interest rate is set to equal a target, comprised of the sum of
targets for the real interest rate and ination, and to respond strongly to deviations of
ination and output from their respective targets. Woodford (2003, p. 287) argues that
when all shocks are to demand, a Taylor Rule, with a time-varying interest rate target
equal to the natural rate, implements optimal monetary policy. Setting the nominal
interest rate equal to the natural rate assures that both the output gap and ination are
zero. The strong response of the interest rate to deviations of ination and output from
their targets eliminates sunspot equilibria, thereby assuring that the equilibrium is locally
unique.
The monetary authority cannot set the nominal interest rate equal to the natural rate,
as required by Woodfords implementation of optimal monetary policy with the Taylor
Rule, when the natural rate is negative. We show that there is a Taylor-Rule policy for
exiting the ZLB, which can implement optimal monetary policy at the ZLB. The monetary
authority must make two changes to Woodfords Taylor Rule. First, it must announce the
rst date on which the Taylor Rule applies, an exit date, setting the nominal interest rate
to zero until that date. Second, the monetary authority modies the Taylor Rule with an
ination target which declines at a xed rate after the exit date.1 This Taylor-Rule exit
policy di¤ers from a "truncated" version of Woodfords Taylor Rule on two counts. First,
exit is postponed beyond the date on which the natural rate rst becomes positive; second,
exit occurs at a non-zero ination target. We show that when these policy parameters are
chosen optimally, commitment to the optimal Taylor-Rule exit policy implements optimal
monetary policy at the ZLB.
1There is empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis that actual monetary policy has operated
with a time-varying ination target in the Taylor Rule. Ireland (2007) argues that US ination can be
explained by a New Keynesian model with a Taylor Rule only if the ination target is allowed to vary
over time. Additionally, Kozicki and Tinsley (2001), Rudebusch and Wu (2004) and Gurkaynak, Sack
and Swanson (2005) provide evidence of a time-varying short-run ination target for the US.
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There is another way to view our result. It is well known that optimal monetary policy
can be implemented by adding an unstable Taylor-rule term to the path of the interest
rate implied by optimal policy. At the ZLB, such a Taylor rule would set the nominal
interest rate to zero until the optimal exit date; thereafter the nominal interest rate is
determined by the rst order conditions for optimal monetary policy. The unstable term,
including the deviation of ination from target and an output gap, yields local uniqueness
of equilibrium. Our contribution is to pin down the value of the interest rate implied by
optimal policy at the ZLB in terms of parameters of the Taylor rule: Woodfords natural
rate of interest, the ination target upon exit and its rate of decline, and the optimal exit
date. We show that these policy parameters are su¢ cient to determine optimal path of
the interest rate at the ZLB.
Specication of optimal policy in terms of Taylor-rule parameters allows us to make an
additional contribution. The postponed exit date provides stimulus since the interest rate
will be kept at zero even after the natural rate becomes positive. However, the optimal
ination target is negative, but quantitatively small in absolute value, somewhat reducing
the stimulus created by the postponed exit date. The negative ination target allows the
monetary authority to smooth the squared deviations of the output gap and ination,
responsible for welfare, reducing the large early deviations at the expense of creating small
negative deviations upon exit. Therefore, the optimal Taylor-Rule exit policy requires
commitment to future deation and recession, a requirement which could prove di¢ cult
politically. And the policy requires communicating both an exit time and the path for
an ination target upon exit, communication which could be complicated. Since the
absolute value of the ination target is negative and since earlier exit could substitute for
the negative ination upon exit in terms of stimulus, we consider an alternative policy
with ination upon exit set to zero.
In our alternative Taylor-Rule exit policy, the monetary authority commits only to a
particular exit time in the future, with this exit time chosen optimally, subject to a zero
ination target. We nd that this T-only policy achieves almost all of the welfare gains of
moving from a truncated Taylor Rule to the optimal Taylor-Rule exit policy. Additionally,
communication of this policy is particularly simple, requiring announcement of the exit
date, upon which the monetary authority will return to letting the nominal rate follow
the natural rate. These results justify the US Federal Reserve policy of announcing that
the nominal interest rate would be xed near zero for a "considerable period" of time,
without any additional announcement of future recession or deation.
We extend our model to allow uncertainty in the evolution of the natural rate of inter-
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est after the initial large adverse shock, which creates the ZLB. Results on implementation
of optimal policy and on the near optimality of the T-only policy continue to hold under
uncertainty. However, communication requires more information. The monetary policy
announcement could entail specication of expected policy parameters together with the
way they would change if the evolution of the natural rate di¤ers from its initial expec-
tation.
Our paper is related to other papers which address monetary policy at the ZLB. Adam
and Billi (2006, 2007) and Nakov (2008) have analyzed optimal policy under discretion
and under commitment when autoregressive demand shocks yield the possibility of the
ZLB. They do not explicitly consider implementation, communication, or the Taylor Rule.
Cochrane (2013) shows that the discretionary commitment to exit the ZLB with zero
values for ination and the output gap yields a unique equilibrium at the ZLB. But, he
also argues that if the policy maker could commit to exit the ZLB at di¤erent values for
ination and the output gap, this could yield a preferable equilibrium during the ZLB.
Krugman (1998), Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), Adam and Billi (2006), and Nakov
(2008) demonstrate that optimal monetary policy with commitment relies on an increase
in inationary expectations to leave the ZLB. Levin, Lopez-Salido, Nelson, and Yun (2009)
argue that, when the shock sending the economy to the ZLB is large and persistent, the
stimulus, which conventional monetary policy can provide at the ZLB, is not su¢ cient to
prevent a sizeable recession.
These policies work within the connes of a simple New Keynesian model, in which
the e¤ects of monetary policy are transmitted through the real interest rate. Much of
the literature on monetary policy in a liquidity trap expands policy to unconventional
methods, which are e¤ective to the extent that nancial-market arbitrage is imperfect,
that the monetary authority assumes risk on its balance sheet, and/or the quantity of
money has an e¤ect on the economy independent of its e¤ect on the real interest rate.
These policies are interesting and potentially useful, but the simple New Keynesian model
is not complex enough to provide a role for them.2 In a similar context, Williamson (2010)
argues that there is no ZLB, in the sense that the monetary authority can always nd
some stimulative instrument. This instrument can be unconventional monetary policy,
but we argue that it can also be a commitment to a Taylor-Rule exit policy.
Additionally, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2009), Woodford (2011), Werning
(2012), Erceg and Linde (2014), among others, have considered the implications of using
2Examples of unconventional monetary policy include Auerbach and Obstfeld (2004), Blinder (2000,
2010), Bernanke (2002), Bernanke and Reinhart (2004), Bernanke, Reinhart and Sack (2004), Clouse
et.al. (2003) and Gurkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2004, 2005).
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scal policy when monetary policy loses its e¤ectiveness.3 Understanding the e¤ectiveness
of scal policy at the ZLB, together with its interactions with conventional and unconven-
tional monetary policy is interesting and important, but is not the subject of this paper.
Our focus is more narrow what can the monetary authority do in the absence of scal
cooperation in the stimulus e¤ort?
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the simple New Keynesian
model with a Taylor Rule for monetary policy. The next sections provide solutions under
certainty. Section 3 provides the solution with commitment to the optimal Taylor-Rule
exit policy. Section 4 provides the solution with commitment to optimal monetary policy,
and Section 5 shows that, with parameter values optimally chosen, the Taylor-Rule exit
policy implements optimal monetary policy. Section 6 solves numerically for optimal
values of the exit time and ination target upon exit for the optimal Taylor-Rule exit
policy. Section 7 solves the model under the T-only policy. Section 8 extends the results
to uncertainty and Section 9 concludes.
2 Simple New Keynesian Model with Taylor Rule
Following Woodford (2003) and Walsh (2010), we represent the simple standard lin-
earized New Keynesian model as an IS curve, derived from the Euler Equation of the
representative agent, and a Phillips Curve, derived from a model of Calvo pricing (Calvo,
1983).4 The linearization is about an equilibrium with a long-run ination rate of zero.5
yt = Et (yt+1)   [it   rnt   Ett+1] (1)
t = Et (t+1) + yt: (2)
In these equations yt denotes the output gap; ination (t) is the deviation about a
long-run value of zero; it denotes the nominal interest rate, with a long-run equilibrium
value of r = 1 

; where r is dened as the long-run real interest rate and rnt as the natural
rate of interest;  represents the intertemporal elasticity of substitution with   0; 
3Some unconventional monetary policies are arguable scal policies.
4Eggertsson and Singh (2016) compare the solutions of the log-linearized New Keynesian model with
the exact solution of the non-linear model, and nd that the "di¤erence is modest," even at the ZLB. In
contrast, Ferandex-Villaverde et al (2015) nd some important di¤erences at the ZLB. We retain the log-
linear approximation to permit an analytical solution and to compare with the large body of preceeding
work on optimal monetary policy and the ZLB.
5This does not require that the ination rate be zero in the long run, only that it not be so far from
zero to make the linearization inappropriate (Woodford 2003, p. 79).
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represents the degree of price stickiness;6  2 (0; 1) denotes the discount factor. The
natural rate of interest embodies the combination of the long-run natural rate together
with shocks associated with preferences, technology, scal policy, etc. Following Woodford
(2003, Chapter 4), we do not add an independent shock to ination in the Phillips Curve.7
This restricts the analysis to the case where monetary policy faces no trade-o¤ between
ination and the output gap.
We assume that, if the economy has not recently experienced the zero lower bound,
the monetary authority sets the nominal interest rate according to a Taylor Rule, given
by
it = r
n
t + 

t+1 +  (t   t ) + y (yt   yt ) ; (3)
where t represents a potentially time-varying ination target and y

t is the output target,
8
given by
yt =
t   t+1

: (4)
This Taylor Rule has two distinguishing characteristics. First, it allows a potentially time-
varying ination target. In periods for which the zero lower bound is distant history, the
optimal value for the ination target is zero, and we assume that the monetary authority
chooses an ination target of zero in these circumstances. Second, Woodford (2003) has
shown that optimal policy requires allowing the nominal rate to vary with the natural
rate, yielding a time-varying intercept. Since we allow a potentially time-varying ination
target, our intercept varies not only with the natural rate, but also with the ination
target.
The equilibrium solution for the output gap and ination is independent of the values
for ' and 'y as long as they are large enough to assure two unstable roots.
9 Therefore,
it is important to understand the role of these policy parameters. The promise to respond
strongly to any sunspot shocks that raise ination and/or output, in Cochranes (2011)
words, "to blow up the economy" in the event of sunspot shocks, serves to rule out
6 = (1 s)(1 s)s
 1+!
1+!" , where s 2 (0; 1) represents the fraction of randomly selected rms that cannot
adjust their price optimally in a given period. Therefore, s = 0 )  ! 1 ) complete exibility and
s = 1)  = 0) complete stickiness. Hence,  2 (0;1)) incomplete exibility. ! > 0 is the elasticity
of rms real marginal cost with respect to its own output, " > 0 is the price elasticity of demand of the
goods produced by monopolistic rms. See, Adam and Billi (2006) and Woodford (2003) for details.
7Adam and Billi (2006) demonstrate that calibrated supply shocks are not large enough to send the
economy to the zero lower bound.
8This specication for target output follows Woodford (2003), p. 246. He sets target output equal to
the solution of equation (2) with ination set at target ination. Ours di¤ers because the target ination
can vary over time.
9The criteria for two unstable roots is:  ('   1) + (1  )'y > 0:
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sunspot equilibria and to assure a locally unique equilibrium. This requires that the
monetary authority be completely transparent, communicating the intention to "blow up
the economy" and that this threat be completely credible. This is because ' and 'y
do not show up in the equilibrium solution and therefore cannot be inferred from any
observable evidence.10
The monetary authority can follow the Taylor Rule, described by equation (3), as
long as it yields a positive nominal interest rate. Once the natural rate of interest falls
below zero, the Taylor Rule becomes infeasible. We follow Jung, Teranishi and Watanabe
(2005) by assuming that a large adverse shock creates the ZLB. Additionally, the shock is
autoregressive and vanishes at a xed rate. Specically, we assume that in period t = 1 a
large adverse shock to the natural rate sends the nominal interest rate in the Taylor Rule
to zero. The shock () deteriorates at rate  such that
rnt = r
n +  1t 1:
where, rn = r = 1 

. In order to obtain analytical results, we continue to follow Jung et
al (2005) and assume that there are no other shocks, restricting our solution to certainty.
We extend the results to include uncertainty in the natural rate of interest in Section 9.
Nakov (2008) considered a "truncated" Taylor Rule, in which the monetary authority
follows a Taylor Rule11 whenever it implies a positive nominal interest rate and otherwise
sets the nominal rate to zero. We can express a truncated Taylor Rule with a zero ination
target as
it = max

rnt +  (t   t ) + y (yt   yt ) ; 0
	
:
In this paper, we o¤er two alternative Taylor-Rule modications. Both allow conventional
monetary policy to retain stimulative e¤ects at the ZLB, in contrast to the truncated
Taylor Rule. In the rst, the monetary authority commits to an exit date, whereupon it
will begin to follow a Taylor rule with an announced ination target, which declines at an
announced rate. In the second, the monetary authority only commits to follow the Taylor
Rule on an announced exit date.
10Cochrane (2011) emphasizes that at the optimal equilibrium, values for ' and 'y do not a¤ect the
equilibrium. Woodford (2003, p. 288) makes the same point. If there were shocks to the Phillips Curve,
or if the intercept to the Taylor Rule did not vary optimally, then we would have evidence on the values
of ' and 'y. However, we would not have evidence that the monetary authority would actually "blow
up" the economy in the event of a sunspot shock.
11Nakovs (2008) Taylor Rule does not have a time-varying intercept.
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3 Solution with Full Commitment to a Taylor-Rule
Exit Policy
The Taylor-Rule exit policy requires that the monetary authority announce an exit
policy whereby it promises to implement equation (3) with ination target
T+1+i = 
i

 i  0;
on its chosen exit date (T + 1) : The choice of the time-varying ination target requires
that the monetary authority choose two parameters, the ination target on the exit date
() ; and the rate at which it declines (). Prior to the announced exit date, the nominal
interest rate remains zero. The monetary authority must be able to fully commit.
We follow Jung et al (2005) and separate the solution into two phases, one after exiting
the ZLB and the other before.
3.1 Solution on Exit Date from ZLB Forward
Substituting the interest rate from the Taylor Rule (3), and target output, from equa-
tion (4) using t+1 from equation (2), into the demand equation (1) yields a two-equation
system given by
yt+1 =

1 + 

y +



yt + 

  
1


t   t+1; (5)
t+1 =  

yt +
1

t; (6)
where
t+1 = z

t z =     +
y

(1  ) :
When y and  are chosen large enough to satisfy the Taylor Principle, as we assume
here, both roots, denoted by 1 and 2; are larger than one. We solve forward, with both
the output gap and ination determined to eliminate the two unstable roots, yielding
values for initial conditions upon exit as
yT+1 =
(1  )z
 (1   ) (2   )
; (7)
T+1 =
z
 (1   ) (2   )
: (8)
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Note that yT+1 and T+1 are related by
yT+1 =
(1  )

T+1: (9)
Values for the output gap and ination beyond the exit date are governed by the
monetary authoritys choices for the ination target,  and the rate at which the target
vanishes, : We can write the solution either in terms of 
 and , or, using equation
(8), in terms of T+1 and : For t  T + 1; the appendix shows that values are given by
yt =
(1  )
 (1   ) (2   )
zt (T+1) 
 =
(1  )

t (T+1) T+1; (10)
t =

 (1   ) (2   )
zt (T+1) 
 = t (T+1) T+1: (11)
The nominal interest rate is set to achieve these values for the output gap and ination.
Imposing certainty and solving equation (1) for the nominal interest rate yields its value
on the date of exit from the ZLB and beyond (t  T + 1) is
it = r
n
t + t+1 +
1

(yt+1   yt) ; t  T + 1:
3.2 Solution Prior to Exit ZLB
Equations (1) and (2), with the nominal interest rate set to zero, yield solutions for
the output gap and ination prior to exit. One root is less than one and one is greater.
We denote the stable root by !1 and the unstable one by !2: The solutions are subject
to the terminal conditions given by equations (7) and (8).
Equations (33) and (34) in the appendix contain solutions as
yt =
1
(!2 !1)

1
!1
T+1 t
(!2   ) (1  !1) +

1
!2
T+1 t
(   !1) (1  !2)

T+1
+ 
(!2 !1)
TX
k=t

1
!1
k+1 t
(1  !1) 

1
!2
k+1 t
(1  !2)

rnk ;
(12)
t =
1
(!2 !1)

1
!1
T+1 t
(!2   ) +

1
!2
T+1 t
(   !1)

T+1
+ 
(!2 !1)
TX
k=t

1
!1
k+1 t
 

1
!2
k+1 t
rnk :
(13)
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These equations illustrate how the Taylor-Rule exit policy a¤ects the behavior of the
output gap and ination during the period of the ZLB. If we were truncating the Taylor
Rule, then the only terms determining the output gap and ination at the ZLB would be
those with the natural rate of interest, while the natural rate is negative. For standard
parameter values, the terms multiplying the natural rates are positive. Therefore, the
negative natural rate terms yield negative e¤ects.
The Taylor-Rule exit policy adds terms with positive natural rates up until the last
period prior to the chosen exit date, providing a stimulative e¤ect. The stimulus is
greater the more natural rate terms are added, that is, the further into the future exit
is postponed. The Taylor-Rule exit policy also adds a term with the value of ination
upon exit (T+1). The term multiplying T+1 is positive and increasing in T . Therefore,
a positive value of ination upon exit also provides stimulus. From equation (8), the
monetary authority chooses values for the ination target () and the rate at which the
ination target vanishes () ; thereby choosing the value of ination upon exit (T+1) :
To gain insight on how optimal values for the policy parameters are determined under
an optimal Taylor-Rule exit policy, we turn to the solution for fully optimal policy.
4 Solution under Optimal Policy
Under fully optimal policy the standard presentation has the monetary authority di-
rectly choose values for the output gap, ination, and the nominal interest rate, subject
to equations (1) and (2) and to the restriction that the nominal interest rate be positive,
to maximize utility of the representative agent. We use Woodfords (2003) linear approx-
imation to the utility function of the representative agent when equilibrium ination is
zero and the exible-price value for output is e¢ cient. The Lagrangian is given by
L1 =
1X
t=1
t 1

 1
2
 
2t + y
2
t
  1;t [ (it   rnt   t+1)  yt+1 + yt]  2;t [t   yt   t+1] + 3;tit ;
where the third restriction represents the inequality constraint on the nominal interest
rate. First order conditions with respect to t; yt; and it respectively are
2;t   2;t 1 + t    11;t 1 = 0; (14)
1;t    11;t 1 + yt   2;t = 0; (15)
 1;t + 3;t = 0 3;tit  0 3;t  0 it  0: (16)
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Equations (16) reveal that in the period of the ZLB when the nominal interest rate is zero,
that 3;t is weakly positive, implying that 1;t is weakly positive. In the period after exit
from the ZLB, the nominal interest rate becomes positive, moving 3;t to zero, implying
that 1;t is zero.
4.1 Solution for Output Gap and Ination after Exit from ZLB
(t  T + 2)
Exit from the ZLB occurs in period T + 1. After exit, 1;t = 0 and it  0: We begin
the solution with period T +2 instead of period T +1; since 1;T+1 = 0; but its lag
 
1;T

could be positive. The equations of the model become
yt+1 = yt +  (it   rnt   t+1) ; (17)
t+1 =  

yt +
1

t; (18)
2;t   2;t 1 + t = 0; (19)
yt   2;t = 0: (20)
First di¤erence equation (20) to yield
yt+1   yt = 

 
2;t+1   2;t

:
Substitute from equation (19) to yield
yt+1   yt =  

t+1 =





yt   1

t

: (21)
Equations (18) and (21) can be solved to yield values for output and ination in periods
T + 2 and beyond with initial values in period T + 1:
One root exceeds unity and the other is less than unity. Letting  2 be the smaller
stable root, initial values for output and ination must lie along the saddlepath, thereby
eliminating the unstable root, and requiring
yT+1 =
(1   2)

T+1 =
 2
 (1   2)
T+1; (22)
10
where the second equality uses the characteristic equation for the system.12 Solutions
depend on the initial conditions, determined to assure stability after exit, and the stable
root. Equations (47) and (48) in the appendix yield solutions for t  T + 1 as
yt =

1   2


 
t (T+1)
2 T+1; (23)
t =  
t (T+1)
2 T+1: (24)
The optimal values for T and T+1 are unique and are provided by solution for the
multipliers below in Section 6. These solutions provide guidance on how the monetary
authority, operating the Taylor-Rule exit policy, should optimally choose policy parame-
ters.
4.2 Solution Prior to Exit the ZLB
The solution for yt and t; prior to exiting the ZLB, is similar to that under the Taylor-
Rule exit policy because, with the nominal interest rate set equal to zero, the dynamic
behavior of the output gap and ination is governed by identical equations. The only
di¤erence is that the relationship between output and ination at T + 1 is governed by
 2 in equations (22) instead of by  in equation (9). Solutions are given by
yt =
1
 (!2   !1)
"
1
!1
T+1 t
(!2    2) (1  !1) +

1
!2
T+1 t
( 2   !1) (1  !2)
#
T+1
+

 (!2   !1)
"
TX
k=t

1
!1
k+1 t
(1  !1) 

1
!2
k+1 t
(1  !2)
#
rnk ; (25)
t =
1
(!2   !1)
"
1
!1
T+1 t
(!2    2) +

1
!2
T+1 t
( 2   !1)
#
T+1
+

 (!2   !1)
"
TX
k=t

1
!1
k+1 t
 
TX
k=t

1
!2
k+1 t#
rnk : (26)
These equations yield the same insights about how policy can a¤ect the time paths of
the output gap and ination during the ZLB. Postponing exit time (T + 1) beyond the
12The second expression is identical to that in Jung et al (2005).
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date on which the natural rate becomes positive adds terms with positive values of the
natural rate, creating stimulus. The term multiplying ination upon exit is positive and
increasing in T . Therefore, a positive value of ination upon exit (T+1) also provides
stimulus.
5 Equivalence between Commitment to the Optimal
Taylor-Rule Exit Policy and Optimal Policy
Theorem: If the monetary authority chooses its policy parameters, T + 1;
; and 
; optimally, then the Taylor Rule exit policy implements optimal
monetary policy.
Proof: Solutions for the output gap and ination before exit under the Taylor
Rule, equations (12) and (13), are equivalent to those under optimal policy
after exit, equations (25) and (26), if the monetary authority chooses  =  2;
chooses T equal to its optimal value, and chooses  to yield the optimal
ination rate upon exit, T+1: The last choice requires a value of the ination
target given by
 =
 (1   ) (2   )
z
T+1:
Additionally, these choices imply that solutions for values of the output gap
and ination after exit under the Taylor Rule, given by equations (10) and (11),
are identical to solutions after exit under optimal policy, given by equations
(23) and (24).
Therefore, the monetary authority can implement optimal policy by postponing exit
from the ZLB until the optimal exit time, choosing an ination target in the Taylor Rule
compatible with the optimal value of ination upon exit, and allowing the target to vanish
at a rate given by the value of the stable root with optimal policy after exit ( =  2) :
Since agents are familiar with the Taylor Rule, and the addition of a time-varying
ination target is a small modication, the Taylor-Rule exit policy provides a way to
implement and communicate optimal policy during and following a zero lower bound
event. Full commitment to the Taylor-Rule exit policy, with the Taylor-rule parameters
chosen optimally, is optimal policy.
Optimal exit time and the optimal ination target are determined by continuing to
solve the optimal monetary policy problem for the multipliers.
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6 Optimal Exit Time and Ination Value
6.1 Analytical Solution
Equations (25) and (26) provide solutions for output and ination prior to exiting the
ZLB, conditional on values for T and T+1: Solution for optimal values of T+1 and T ,
requires solutions for the multipliers leading up to and including the exit period, T + 1:
We show in the appendix that the equations of the model (17) and (18), together with the
optimality equations (19) and (20) and the requirement that the multiplier on the interest
rate be zero in the period of exit
 
1;T+1 = 0

; impose optimal values on the multipliers
in the period prior to exit as
1;T = 0; (27)
2;T =
1
(1   2)
T+1; (28)
We use these values as terminal conditions on a forward solution of the system for the
multipliers.
The appendix provides a forward solution, yielding values of the multipliers at alter-
native candidate values of T: The optimal value for T is the value which yields a zero
value for 1;T : Given this value for T; the optimal value for T+1 is the forward solution
for 2;T ; together with equation (28).
6.2 Quantitative Solution
6.2.1 Benchmark Parameter Values
As a benchmark, we use the RBC parameterization from Adam and Billi (2006),
 = 1;  = 0:99;  = 0:057; ' = 1:5; 'y = 0:5;  = 0:0074:
All ow values are expressed at quarterly rates. The values for the elasticity of substitution
and the discount factor are standard. The value of  is consistent with 34% of rms
adjusting their price each period when demand elasticity is 7.66 and the elasticity of rm
marginal cost is 0.47.
6.2.2 Problems with Integer T
The numerical algorithm considers alternative values for the optimal T by computing
values for 1;T for successive values of T; beginning with T large enough for the nominal
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interest rate to be positive. In this range, 1;T is falling in T; eventually becoming negative
as T continues to increase. Equation (44) requires that 1;T = 0 at the optimum. However,
since T increases discretely, with 1;T falling in T , for a given value for the shock, there
is a value for T for which 1;T > 0 and 1;T+1 < 0: We never actually observe a value of
T for which 1;T = 0 due to the integer constraint on T:
For each value of the shock, consider choosing T as the last date for which 1;T remains
positive (theoretically, it is never negative). The value for the ination target is determined
by the corresponding value for 2;T : Figure (1) plots values for 1;T and 2;T ; over a range
of values for the initial shock, ; where the value for T is calculated as suggested above.
Figure 1: Multipliers for Di¤erent Shocks
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The integer constraint on T prevents 2;T from moving monotonically with shock size
As the size of the shock increases, there is a range of values for the size of the shock,
for which exit time (T + 1) is xed due to the integer constraint (not shown in graph).
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Over this range, both multipliers increase as the shock size increase. The increase in both
multipliers is reecting the need for greater stimulus as the shock size rises. The increase
in 1;T is indicating that T should rise (it cannot due to the integer constraint). The
increase in 2;T represents a higher optimal ination target upon exit (T+1) ; given the
xed exit time. The higher shock value implies a higher optimal value for stimulus. With
xed T; the only way to get the additional stimulus is with a higher exit ination target.
As shock size increases, with exit time xed due to the integer constraint, the ination
target rises to generate the additional stimulus.
As the size of the shock continues to increase, there is a critical value for the shock for
which 1;T has reached such a large value, that optimality requires a discrete increase in T ,
sending 1;T back toward zero. The increase in exit time provides stimulus, allowing the
ination target to fall, with the optimal exit time and ination target still providing the
additional stimulus required by the larger shock. Therefore, at these critical shock values,
exit time rises by one unit and both multipliers fall discretely. As shock size continues to
rise above each of these critical values, the size of both multipliers rises until the shock
reaches another critical value. Therefore, both multipliers reach local minima at critical
values of shock size for which exit time discretely rises.
Since 1;T > 0; the optimal exit time is actually larger than T: If exit time were
continuous, we could raise exit time just enough to get 1;T = 0: This increase in exit
time would provide additional stimulus implying a smaller value for 2;T : The closer 1;T
is to zero, the less we would need to raise a continuous value for the exit time above our
choice of T to get 1;T to reach zero. Therefore, the optimal exit time, chosen by the
above method, approaches the optimum without an integer constraint, as the value for
1;T approaches zero. Since we optimally want to raise T less at critical shock values, the
integer constraint is least binding at these critical values. And the value for 2;T is also
closest to its value without an integer constraint for these critical values of shocks. For
shock values for which 1;T is rises above zero, the integer constraint binds more severely,
and the ination target is higher to provide the additional stimulus that is not provided
by increasing exit time by a non-integer amount.
We can use Figure (1) to compare the optimal value of ination upon exit, implied
by values of 2;T ; for any two discrete values of the shock. Depending on the particular
shock sizes we choose to compare, the ination target could rise or fall as the shock size
increases. With comparison shock sizes chosen arbitrarily, the integer constraint could be
relatively more binding for one than for the other, a¤ecting the accompanying value for
the exit ination target. The integer constraint is a¤ecting the solution, particularly the
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value for optimal ination upon exit.
We do not believe that the integer constraint actually constrains monetary policy. A
binding integer constraint would mean that there are only four dates in the year on which
the monetary authority could choose to raise the interest rate for the rst time. This
restriction does not appear realistic. Therefore, we want a solution for which the integer
constraint is as close to non-binding as possible. The integer constraint is least binding
at the critical values of shocks for which the multipliers reach local minima. We consider
shock values which increase in increments of 1.0e-9, so that minimum values for 1;T get
very close to zero. From this set of shock values, we restrict attention to the set of critical
shock values for which the multipliers reach local minima. For these critical values, the
integer constraint is least binding.
With these restrictions, multipliers are the lower envelopes of the two seesaw lines in
Figure 1. As shock size rises, 1;T remains very close to zero. In contrast, 2;T is negative
for any shock size and is falling in shock size. This later result implies that optimal
ination upon exit is always negative and that it is decreasing in shock size. Failure to
restrict attention to shock values for which the multipliers reach local minima yields a
positive value for optimal ination upon exit for some shock values. Positive ination
is compensating for the inability to raise exit time by something less than one discrete
unit and therefore for having exit time too small relative to the optimal continuous value.
Additional experimentation has revealed that the negative value for ination upon exit
is robust to persistence of the shock and to changes in other parameter values when we
restrict attention to shock sizes for which the integer constraint on T is least binding.13
6.2.3 Optimal Exit Strategy
We present the optimal exit strategy in terms of the Taylor-Rule exit policy. All values
for the output gap, ination and the nominal interest rate along the adjustment path are
identical to those for optimal policy. Our purpose in using the Taylor-Rule exit policy to
present the results is to illustrate that communication can occur in terms of the Taylor
Rule, augmented with the time-varying ination target and an date for exit from the ZLB.
Consider the time paths for the output gap and ination with the optimal Taylor-
Rule exit policy after a particularly large adverse shock,  =  0:02253508 in period one,
sending the natural rate to an annual rate of -4.97% . We chose the exact value for the
shock so that 1;T would be very close to zero (on the lower envelope of the seesaw line
13We have reduced persistence to 0.80, considered values of  equal to 2 and 4, and considered a lower
value for  equal to 0.024.
16
in Figure 1), implying an almost non-binding integer constraint for T: We set persistence
high ( = 0:90) such that the natural rate that does not return to positive territory until
period nine. The monetary authority optimally postpones raising the interest rate until
period 14, fully ve periods after the natural rate has become positive. Optimal ination
in the exit period is negative and is given by (1   2)2;T =  0:0396% at a quarterly
rate. This requires an ination target for the Taylor Rule given by equation (8), as
 =
 (1    2) (2    2)
z
T+1 =  0:0703%;
where the monetary authority has chosen  =  2:
Figure 2 plots the time paths for the output gap, ination, and the nominal interest
rate, beginning with the initial shock. Values on the vertical axis are quarterly percentages
expressed at annual rates, while values on the horizontal axis are quarters. The shock
occurs in quarter 1. As a benchmark, we also plot the time paths that a truncated Taylor
Rule, with a zero ination target and an intercept given by the natural rate, would deliver.
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Figure 2: Alternative Taylor Rules
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Time paths under the optimal Taylor Rule exit policy reveal stimulus compared to those under a
truncated Taylor Rule while the natural rate of interest is positive.
Before continuing with the presentation of the Taylor-Rule exit policy, consider why
the truncated Taylor Rule is a natural benchmark. The truncated Taylor Rule represents
optimal policy when the monetary authority can commit only to follow a Taylor Rule,
but not to an exit date or an ination target. Essentially, the truncated Taylor Rule
implements optimal discretionary policy.14 Under this policy, the nominal interest rate
is zero as long as the natural rate is negative. Once the natural rate becomes positive,
the monetary authority optimally raises the nominal rate to the natural rate, thereby
returning both the output gap and ination to their optimal values of zero.
14As Cochrane (2011) argues, the Taylor Rule itself requires commitment to "blow up" the economy
in the event of a sunspot shock, thereby assuring a locally unique equilibrium.
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Under full commitment to the Taylor-Rule exit policy, the monetary authority promises
to postpone the exit date15 and to exit with deation which vanishes over time. The exit
date and the ination-target parameters are all chosen optimally. This policy provides
considerable stimulus upon impact, all stemming from the postponed exit date. The later
exit date implies that there are more periods for which the monetary authority could
have raised the nominal interest rate, but has chosen not to. This raises inationary
expectations, raising output and ination, compared to a truncated Taylor Rule.
In contrast, the negative ination target upon exit reduces inationary expectations
and is contractionary. As the exit date nears, expectations of deation actually cause a
small recession coupled with deation prior to the arrival of the exit date. On the exit
date, the monetary authority raises the nominal interest rate higher than the real rate to
exacerbate the recession and deation, each of which reach troughs at -0.16% and -1.34%
respectively, at annual rates. Both remain small and quickly vanish over the next few
quarters. The deation and recession upon exit point to the importance of the ability to
commit, not only to an exit date, but also to exit with deation and recession.
The negative value of ination upon exit runs counter to the notion that all means of
monetary-policy stimulus should be employed at the ZLB, including postponing exit time
and raising ination upon exit. Eggertsson and Woodford (2003, 2004), Walsh (2009),
Levine et al (2009), and Cochrane (2013) all discuss the benets of promising to exit the
ZLB with positive ination. Why does optimal policy require a negative ination target
which produces a small future recession with deation?
The rst reason is technical. As explained in Section 6.2.2, when we restrict attention
to shock values for which the integer constraint is least binding, we obtain a negative
ination target, where the negativity is robust to shock size and to alternative parame-
terization. However, there is also an intuitive economic explanation. Loss is determined
by discounted squared deviations. The large adverse shock itself creates large negative
deviations, which vanish over time under a truncated Taylor Rule. The postponed exit
date raises the adjustment paths for output and ination relative to the paths under
the truncated Taylor rule, reducing the negative deviations and creating some positive
deviations. The negative ination target shifts adjustment paths somewhat downward,
reducing the magnitudes of the largest positive deviations in exchange for creating small
negative deviations upon exit. Since loss depends on squared deviations, it is optimal
to reduce peak positive deviations at the expense of adding small negative deviations,
smoothing deviations across time.
15The postponed exit date is the feature of optimal monetary policy emphasized by Jung et al (2005).
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In contrast, Eggertsson and Woodford (2003, 2004) nd that optimal policy at the
ZLB requires a positive ination target upon exit. However, they use a di¤erent process
for the natural rate of interest, one for which the natural rate switches discretely between
two values, one positive and one negative. With this interest rate process, the expected
exit date depends entirely on the ination target upon exit, implying that exit time and
the ination target cannot move separately. A postponed exit date requires an increase
in ination upon exit. In papers which compute optimal policy using an autoregressive
process for the interest rate, authors do not highlight the value of the ination target
upon exit, leaving it as an inference in graphs for the adjustment paths.16 To the extent
that they obtain a positive target upon exit, it appears very small. Our hypothesis for
why other authors might nd a positive value for ination upon exit is that the integer
constraint is a¤ecting the result. For shock values which deliver values of 1;T further
from zero than our set of critical shock values, optimal T is higher than allowed by the
integer constraint requiring a higher (sometimes positive) ination target to provide the
extra stimulus which a non-integer increase in T cannot provide. Even though our paper
di¤ers with others on the optimal value of ination upon exit, the overall implications are
the same. Optimal policy at the ZLB requires stimulus, and the stimulus works through
higher inationary expectations, reducing the real rate of interest. The postponed exit
date raises inationary expectations in all the models. And although ination is negative
in our model in the exit period, it is positive on the rst date for which the natural rate
becomes positive.
To measure loss, we follow Adam and Billi (2007) and express loss in terms of "wel-
fare equivalent permanent consumption reduction", which is essentially the value of the
quadratic approximation to welfare. We restrict attention to values of shocks which min-
imize 1;T ; minimizing the e¤ects of the integer constraint. We nd that the absolute
value of consumption deviations is 7 times larger under the truncated Taylor Rule than
under the optimal Taylor-Rule exit policy. In general, relative loss is increasing in both
the size of the shock and in its persistence. With high persistence, 0.90 in this example,
and a range of initial shocks sending the natural rate of interest to values between -0.06
and -4.97 at annual rates, the absolute value of consumption deviations due to failure to
commit ranges from about 2.5 to 7 times that under commitment. When persistence is
lower, for example 0.80, the upper range of excess loss is smaller, between 2.6 and 3.2 times
that under commitment. These results highlight the relative importance of pursuing the
optimal Taylor-Rule exit policy when the negative shock is large and highly persistent.
16Examples include Adam and Billi (2006), Jung, Teranishi and Watanabe (2005), and Nakov (2008).
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The need to commit to a future recession and deation could pose a political problem
to commitment, even though the magnitude of the recession and deation are small.17
Additionally, communication of the policy in terms of an exit date and a time-varying
ination target could be complicated. The forward guidance provided by the Federal
Reserve on US monetary policy stresses that the nominal interest rate will remain zero
for a "considerable period," but never states that once that period ends, that it will
rise su¢ ciently to exacerbate or create a recession and deation. And given that the
stimulus e¤ects of postponing exit and negative ination upon exit are opposite, choosing
somewhat earlier exit could substitute for the negative ination upon exit. What does
the monetary authority lose in welfare if it commits to postpone the exit date from the
ZLB beyond that using a truncated Taylor Rule, but not to a deation target upon exit,
a policy we label "T-only"?
7 T-only Taylor-Rule Exit Policy
In this section, we investigate a policy in which the monetary authority chooses the
exit date optimally, conditional upon a zero ination target upon exit. Upon exit, the
monetary authority returns to the Taylor-Rule with an ination target of zero.18 This
policy is very much like the "forward guidance" for interest rates which the US Federal
Reserve enacted in 2008, whereby they have promised to keep nominal interest rates near
zero for "a considerable period." The forward guidance in our T-only policy is identical
if the implicit promise by the Federal Reserve is to return to its traditional Taylor Rule
policy.
We solve this problem numerically, choosing the value for the exit date (T + 1) which
yields the highest welfare. We solve the optimization problem over a large grid of mag-
nitudes for the shocks and observe that as shock size increases, welfare has a downward
trend, but the fall is not monotonic. Specically, when the integer value for T is optimal,
welfare reaches a local maximum, and, as the shock size changes in both directions, T
remains xed and welfare falls. As the shock size changes from a value for which the
optimal value of T is an integer, agents would like to chose a non-integer value for T ,
but cannot, implying lower welfare. Since we do not believe that the integer constraint
is actually binding in the real world, we would like to consider results where the integer
value for T is very close optimal. Therefore, we follow a strategy similar to that in the
17Jeanne and Svensson (2007) are concerned with the ability to commit to positive ination upon exit.
18Carlstrom, Fuerst, and Paustian (2012) analyze a similar policy in the same New Keynesian model
without the initial adverse shock creating the ZLB.
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analytical solution of the optimal Taylor-Rule exit policy. We identify a critical set of
shocks associated with local maxima for welfare. With this set of shocks, welfare is falling
in the size of the shock.
We want welfare comparisons under Taylor Rules with optimal policy and with T-only
policy. This is problematical since the sets of critical shock values, those for which the
integer constraint is least binding, di¤er in the two cases. However, there are two instances
in which critical shock values for the two policies are identical up to four decimal points.
We compare these two sets of shocks. When the shock with optimal policy is 0.011557
and that with T-only is .0115960, then T-only creates consumption deviations 20 percent
larger than under optimal policy. The second comparable pair of shocks is 0.018340,
.0183370 with consumption deviations 7 percent larger under T-only. These results imply
that postponing the exit date achieves most of the gains of moving from the truncated
Taylor Rule to full commitment to the optimal Taylor-Rule exit policy.
Figure 3: Compare T-Only with Other Taylor Rules
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Time paths under T-Only policy are very similar to the optimal Taylor Rule exit policy and more stimulative
than paths under a truncated Taylor Rule while the natural rate is negative.
We reinforce these insights by comparing time paths for the larger pair of shocks in
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Figure 3, shocks which initially send the natural rate to -3.30%.19 This is a smaller shock
than we considered in the previous section with correspondingly smaller adverse e¤ects.
With the T-only policy, exit occurs one period earlier than with optimal policy, in period
10 instead of in period 11. In the exit period, the nominal interest rate is set to equal the
natural rate, and both the output gap and ination return to zero. The time path for the
output gap, leading up to the T-only exit period, is almost identical to that under optimal
policy, with output slightly higher early, and slightly lower later. Ination is uniformly
higher under T-only than under optimal policy. T-only avoids the deation and recession
in the vicinity of the exit period.
These results seem to justify US Federal Reserve policy following the nancial crisis.
The Fed is likely to face political constraints in committing to future deation and reces-
sion, but not in the timing for initially raising interest rates. We have shown that the
optimal choice of exit time can achieve most of the gains of the optimal Taylor-Rule exit
policy. Additionally, this extension of "nearly" optimal policy to the ZLB is a very sim-
ple extension of Woodfords optimal policy away from the ZLB. The monetary authority
simply announces its date of exit from the ZLB and then returns to Woodfords optimal
policy. Therefore, communication is relatively simple. The policy di¤ers from optimal
discretion in that the monetary authority can commit to keep the interest rate at the ZLB
beyond the date on which the natural rate becomes positive.
8 Extension to Uncertainty
8.1 Analytical Solution under Uncertainty
We generalize our analysis to include stochastic shocks to the natural rate of interest.
In Appendix 10.3, we show that equilibrium for the system under optimal policy with
uncertainty is characterized by equations (1), (2), (14), (15), and (16).
Consider our stochastic specication for the natural rate of interest. Adam and Billi
(2006) allow Markov shocks to the natural rate of interest and solve using value function
iteration with the multipliers, '1;t and '2;t; as additional state variables. Our proof of
equivalence between optimal policy and the fully optimal Taylor-Rule exit policy requires
an analytical solution. This restriction limits the nature of the uncertainty we can intro-
duce. The values for 1;t and 2;t at each value for t depend on the entire interest rate
19We are comparing time paths for a slightly di¤erent shock value for the T-only policy. When we
use the identical value, the di¤erence is so small that there is no perceptable di¤erence in results on the
graph.
23
history since the period the system entered the ZLB. In the forward solution we use, the
expectations must account for all possible realizations of the entire interest rate path until
exit from the ZLB occurs. Introducing Markov shocks to the natural interest rate yields
potential paths for the interest rate history, which expand too quickly, as time at the ZLB
grows, to be practical. Therefore, we introduce a simpler form of uncertainty to the path
of the natural interest rate.
We choose the nature of uncertainty to focus on the fact that the date, on which the
natural rate of interest rst becomes positive again, is unknown. We assume that there
are three distinct paths for the real interest rate after the initial shock, determined by
three distinct paths for : We refer to these alternative paths as interest rate regimes.
Prior to t = t^, the shock vanishes at rate  according to
t = 
t 1 t  t^:
rnt = r
n +  1t; t  t^:
In period t^+1; persistence becomes either    or +  with probability $ or remains 
with probability 1   2$: Therefore, there are three paths for the natural rate, based on
the shock to persistence given by
1;t = (   )t t^  t^ 1
2;t = 
t 1
3;t = ( + )
t t^  t^ 1
with the natural interest rate given by20
rni;t = r
n +  1i;t: t  t^+ 1 i 2 f1; 2; 3g :
We assume that agents know the three potential paths for the interest rate together with
their probabilities. They use this information, together with information provided by the
monetary authority about exit dates and ination targets, conditional on each regime, to
form expectations.
In Appendix 10.3, we solve the equations for output and ination with uncertainty
forward, yielding solutions similar to those in the certainty case. The solution di¤ers from
that under certainty because agentsexpectations of future output and ination depend
20We can think about stochastic persistence as occuring due to the realization of additional shocks,
with high persistence equivalent to additional adverse shocks.
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on expectations of the future interest rate, where the interest rate can follow one of three
paths. The solution prior to exit from the ZLB depends upon exit times, Ti, i 2 (1; 2; 3)
and on values for ination upon exit in each interest-rate regime, with outcomes in each
regime weighted by probability. This system of equations and its solutions, as a function
of exit times and the path of ination upon exit, applies whether monetary policy is
conducted according to the Taylor-Rule exit policy or optimal policy. With optimal
monetary policy, additional equations for the multipliers, also solved in the appendix,
yield solutions for optimal ination upon exit and exit dates.
When the monetary authority chooses the optimal values for exit time and for in-
ation upon exit, together with its rate of persistence, then the Taylor-Rule exit policy
implements optimal monetary policy as before. Uncertainty does not invalidate the fun-
damental theorem that the Taylor-Rule exit policy implements optimal policy if exit times
and ination upon exit are chosen optimally.
8.2 Quantitative Solution under Uncertainty
In this section, we compare time paths under certainty and uncertainty, and consider
the welfare cost of moving from the fully optimal Taylor-Rule exit policy to the T-only
policy under uncertainty. The additional parameters we need are those for the change
in the rate of persistence of the initial shock under each interest rate regime () and
the probability of each interest rate regime ($). We set  = 0:05; and $ = 0:25: With
these alternative rates of persistence of the initial shocks, the natural rate of interest
rst becomes positive in period 6 for regime 1 with low persistence, in period 8 with
persistence equal to the benchmark value with certainty, and in period 13 with high
persistence. Therefore, we consider interest rate regimes which return to positive half a
year earlier than the benchmark and a year and a quarter later.
Both the optimal values for exit time and for ination upon exit, conditional on
obtaining the benchmark interest rate path, are identical to their values under certainty.
Therefore, Figure (4) shows that the time paths for the output gap and ination under
certainty and uncertainty, conditional on realization of regime 2, are virtually identical,
having only a slight di¤erence prior to the realization of the uncertainty. The di¤erence
occurs because under uncertainty, the expected future path of interest rates replaces the
actual path while the path is unknown.
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Figure 4: Time Paths under Certainty and Uncertainty
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Time paths under uncertainty with the mean realization of the natural interest rate path are almost identical to
time paths under certainty.
The very small e¤ect of uncertainty on the actual path, conditional on realization of
regime 2, occurs even though exit times and time paths are di¤erent under realizations
of alternative interest rate paths. Figure (5) plots paths for the output gap and ination
with optimal policy in each of the three alternative interest rate regimes. Exit dates
are di¤erent in each regime at 12, 14, and 19, and it is primarily these di¤erent exit
dates that yield the di¤erent time paths. If shock turns out to be more adverse than
initially expected, having higher than expected persistence, then the monetary authority
postpones the exit time from 14 to 19. And there is an analogous adjustment for exit
time in the opposite direction if shocks are more favorable than expected. Exit values
for ination are negative and small with values of -0.170%, -0.158%, and -0.076%. The
amount of uncertainty we have introduced creates an additional consumption deviations
of about 8 percent, implying that its welfare implications are relatively small.21
With uncertainty, the monetary authority must communicate more information. This
21Greater uncertainty would yield greater welfare losses.
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includes exit dates and ination targets conditional on each of the three interest rate
regimes. Announcements could take the form of an expected exit date and ination
target, combined with information about how these would change should the adverse
shock turn out to be more or less persistent.
Figure 5: Time Paths under Alternative Interest Rate Regimes
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Time paths under the three alternative interst rate regimes di¤er beginning with the date on which the true
regime is revealed, primarily due to di¤erent exit dates.
Finally, consider the implications of the T-only policy, whereby the monetary authority
chooses ination equal to zero upon exit, but chooses an exit time for each of the three
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interest rate path realizations. We choose values for the exit time by searching over a grid
of possible exit times and choosing the set of three which maximizes welfare. Exit times
under T-only are slightly earlier, at values of (11, 12, 18) compared with exit times under
optimal policy of (12, 14, 19). Consumption deviations under the T-only policy are about
5% higher than they are under the fully optimal policy.
As in our solution under certainty, our comparison of welfare loss under T-only and
optimal policy is not entirely reliable since a real-world monetary authority would not
have to respect the integer constraint in its choice of exit time. In each measure of
welfare, choices could be distorted more or less by the integer constraint, reducing welfare,
possibly by di¤erent amounts in the two measures. And it appears that the distortion
for this value of the shock is important for the T-only policy because time paths under
alternative interest rate regimes imply that the most contractionary regime is regime 2,
when the most contractionary path for interest rates is regime 3. We let exit in regime 2
come one period earlier and nd that now regime 2 is the least contractionary. Clearly, the
integer constraint is preventing a result where time paths for regime 2 should lie between
time paths for regimes 1 and 3.
Therefore, we consider an alternative value of the shock, -0.0183370, chosen in the
section with certainty to minimize the distortion under the T-only policy. Loss under
this alternative shock value with T-only policy is only 1.45% higher than loss under fully
optimal policy. Therefore, using either shock, the order of magnitude of loss is small and
similar to values we found in our example under certainty where we could choose shock
values to minimize distortions. Additionally, the loss incurred by moving from optimal
policy to T-only is tiny compared to a loss under discretion 10.65 times as large as under
optimal policy.
We also calculate exit times and time paths for alternative interest rate regimes using
the alternative initial shock. Exit times for T-only are (8, 9, 12) in regimes (1, 2, 3)
compared with exit times under optimal policy of (9, 9, 13). Therefore, exit times are
earlier for the rst and third regimes under T-only, but identical for the middle regime.
We compare time paths for each interest rate regime for T-only and optimal policies in
Figure (6).
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Figure 6: Time Paths under Optimal Taylor Rule Exit and T-Only Policies
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The time paths under the optimal Taylor Rule exit and T-Only policies for each realization of the path for the
natural interest rate are very close, with the exception being deation neat exit under the Taylor Rule policy.
For all, the T-only policy eliminates the small negative e¤ects around the exit date,
required by the negative ination upon exit in optimal policy. For regime 2, since exit
dates are identical, paths are virtually identical. Di¤erences for regimes 1 and 3 are also
small. For optimal policy, the negative ination target reduces stimulus, while for T-only,
the earlier exit date provides the stimulus reduction.
29
9 Conclusion
Our rst result is theoretical. We prove analytically that a Taylor Rule exit policy,
with an optimally-chosen value for the exit date and for the time path of ination upon
exit, implements optimal monetary policy at the zero lower bound. This implies that
implementation of optimal monetary policy at the ZLB requires focus on three parameters:
exit time, the ination target upon exit, and the rate of decline of the ination target.
This extends Woodfords result that away from the ZLB, a Taylor rule, with an intercept
given by the natural rate of interest, implements optimal monetary policy.
Our second result is quantitative. We nd that the welfare cost of moving from optimal
policy to a T-only policy is small. Therefore, the monetary authority can implement a
policy very close to optimal by announcing only an exit date from the ZLB. This result
implies that of the three parameters necessary to implement optimal policy, the exit date
is the most important. Our nding is that the ZLB requires a very small modication
of Woodfords Taylor rule to achieve a monetary policy which is "almost" optimal. The
monetary authority can announce only an exit date upon which it will begin to implement
Woodfords well-known Taylor rule.
We derive our results under certainty and show that they continue to hold when we
introduce uncertainty. The monetary authority must announce an expected exit date and
communicate how that date will change if the natural rate of interest evolves di¤erently
from expected. These results justify the policy by the Federal Reserve of promising that
interest rates will remain low for a "considerable period."
10 Appendix
10.1 Solution under Taylor Rule Policy
10.1.1 Solution from Exit Date Forward
We can write this system of equations given by (5) and (6) in matrix notation as"
yt+1
t+1
#
=
"
1 + 

y +





   1

 

1

#"
yt
t
#
 
"
t+1
0
#
:
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The eigenvalues are given by
 =
1 + 1

+ 

y +





1 + 1

+ 

y +


2
  4

1

  
1 + 
 
y + 
 12
2
;
where y and  are chosen such that both eigenvalues exceed unity. Decomposing the
system into eigenvalues and eigenvectors yields"
yt+1
t+1
#
= E E 1
"
yt
t
#
 
"
t+1
0
#
;
where
E =
"
1 1

1 2

1 1
#
  =
"
1 0
0 2
#
E 1 =

 (2   1)
"
1  1 2

 1 1 1

#
;
with
12 =
1

 
1 + 
 
y + 

:
Pre-multiplying by E 1 yields
E 1
"
yt+1
t+1
#
=  E 1
"
yt
t
#
  E 1
"
t+1
0
#
;
where
E 1
"
yt+1
t+1
#
=
"
y
0
t+1

0
t+1
#
E 1
"
t+1
0
#
=

 (2   1)
"
t+1
 t+1
#
:
Substituting yields "
y
0
t+1

0
t+1
#
=
"
1 0
0 2
#"
y
0
t

0
t
#
+
"
  t+1
(2 1)
t+1
(2 1)
#
:
Since both roots exceed unity, we solve each equation forward to yield
y
0
t =

 (2   1)
1X
i=1

1
1
i
t+i;
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
0
t =
 
 (2   1)
1X
i=1

1
2
i
t+i:
We are interested in the value of the variables in the period of exit from the ZLB, that is
in period T + 1:
y
0
T+1 =

 (2   1)
1X
i=1

1
1
i
T+1+i;

0
T+1 =
 
 (2   1)
1X
i=1

1
2
i
T+1+i:
To do the summations, write the expressions for the 0s as
T+2 =

 +
y


T+1  

1 +
y


T+2

=

 +
y

 

1 +
y




 = z;
T+2+i =

 +
y


T+1+i  

1 +
y


T+2+i

=

 +
y

 

1 +
y




i

= zi
:
Substituting, the sums can be expressed as
1X
i=1

1
1
i
T+1+i =
z
1   
;
1X
i=1

1
2
i
T+1+i =
z
2   
:
This allows us to write the solution for the transformed variables as
y
0
T+1 =

 (2   1)

z
1   

;

0
T+1 =
 
 (2   1)

z
2   

:
To solve for the original variables, multiply by the matrix E;"
yT+1
T+1
#
=
"
1 1

1 2

1 1
#"
y
0
T+1

0
T+1
#
;
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yielding
yT+1 =
(1  )
 (1   ) (2   )
z; (29)
T+1 =

 (1   ) (2   )
z: (30)
Note that at T + 1; the output gap is proportional to ination according to
yT+1 =
(1  )

T+1:
These values give us terminal conditions for the solution prior to exit.
Since there is only single stable root, provided by the rate at which the ination target
vanishes, values beyond T + 1 are given by
yt =
(1  )
 (1   ) (2   )
zt (T+1) 
 =
(1  )

t (T+1) T+1; (31)
t =

 (1   ) (2   )
zt (T+1) 
 = t (T+1) T+1: (32)
Substituting from the equations for output and ination after exit, equations (31) and
(32), yields the behavior of the interest rate after exit
it = r
n
t +

1 +
(1  ) (   1)


T+1
t T 1

= rnt +

1 +
(1  ) (   1)

 
z
 (1   ) (2   )

t T 1 :
10.1.2 Solution Prior to Exit ZLB
Equations (1) and (2) with the nominal interest rate set to zero can be written as,"
yt+1
t+1
#
=
"
1 + 

 

 

1

#"
yt
t
#
 
"

0
#
rnt :
The roots of the system are given by
! =
1+

+ 1

1 + 1+

2
  4( 1

)
 1
2
2
;
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implying that one root is larger than unity and one is smaller. Let !1 > 1; be the unstable
root.
We solve the system subject to the terminal conditions given by equations (29) and
(30). Using eigenvalues and eigenvectors, we can express the system as"
yt+1
t+1
#
= F
F 1
"
yt
t
#
 
"
rnt
0
#
;
where
F =
"
1 !1

1 !2

1 1
#

 =
"
!1 0
0 !2
#
F 1 =

 (!2   !1)
"
1  1 !2

 1 1 !1

#
;
with
!1!2 =
1

:
Pre-multiplying by F 1 yields
F 1
"
yt+1
t+1
#
= 
F 1
"
yt
t
#
  F 1
"
rnt
0
#
;
where
F 1
"
yt+1
t+1
#
=
"
y
0
t+1

0
t+1
#
F 1
"
rnt
0
#
=

 (!2   !1)
"
rnt
 rnt
#
:
Substituting yields "
y
0
t+1

0
t+1
#
=
"
!1 0
0 !2
#"
y
0
t

0
t
#
+
"
  rnt
(!2 !1)
rnt
(!2 !1)
#
:
Solve each equation forward to period T + 1, yielding
y
0
t =

1
!1
T+1 t
y
0
T+1 +
TX
k=t

1
!1
k+1 t

 (!2   !1)r
n
k ;

0
t =

1
!2
T+1 t

0
T+1  
TX
k=t

1
!2
k+1 t

 (!2   !1)r
n
k :
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To solve for the original variables, we pre-multiply by the matrix F;"
yt
t
#
=
"
1 !1

1 !2

1 1
#"
y
0
t

0
t
#
;
yielding
yt =
1  !1

"
1
!1
T+1 t
y
0
T+1 +
TX
k=t

1
!1
k+1 t

 (!2   !1)r
n
k
#
+
1  !2

"
1
!2
T+1 t

0
T+1  
TX
k=t

1
!2
k+1 t

 (!2   !1)r
n
k
#
;
t =
"
1
!1
T+1 t
y
0
T+1 +
TX
k=t

1
!1
k+1 t

 (!2   !1)r
n
k
#
+
"
1
!2
T+1 t

0
T+1  
TX
k=t

1
!2
k+1 t

 (!2   !1)r
n
k
#
:
We transform the y
0
T+1 and 
0
T+1 into original variables using the terminal condition
yT+1 =
(1  )

T+1;
and "
y
0
T+1

0
T+1
#
= F 1
"
yT+1
T+1
#
=

 (!2   !1)
"
1  1 !2

 1 1 !1

#"
yT+1
T+1
#
;
to yield
y
0
T+1 =

!2   
!2   !1

T+1;

0
T+1 =

   !1
!2   !1

T+1:
Substituting into the solutions for yt and t yields
yt =
1  !1

"
1
!1
T+1 t 
!2   
!2   !1

T+1 +
TX
k=t

1
!1
k+1 t

 (!2   !1)r
n
k
#
(33)
+
1  !2

"
1
!2
T+1 t 
   !1
!2   !1

T+1  
TX
k=t

1
!2
k+1 t

 (!2   !1)r
n
k
#
;
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t =
"
1
!1
T+1 t 
!2   
!2   !1

T+1 +
TX
k=t

1
!1
k+1 t

 (!2   !1)r
n
k
#
(34)
+
"
1
!2
T+1 t 
   !1
!2   !1

T+1  
TX
k=t

1
!2
k+1 t

 (!2   !1)r
n
k
#
:
For t  T + 2; equation (20), together with equation (23), yields a solution for 2;t given
by
2;t =


yt =
 2
(1   2)
 
t (T+1)
2 T+1:
Therefore, the solution for 2;T+2 is given by
2;T+2 =
 2
(1   2)
 2T+1: (35)
We need solutions for 2;T+1; 2;T ; and 1;T : In period T + 1; the period of exit,
equations (14) and (15) with 1;T+1 = 0 yield
2;T+1   2;T + T+1    11;T = 0; (36)
  11;T + yT+1   2;T+1 = 0: (37)
In period T + 2; these equations imply
2;T+2   2;T+1 + T+2 = 0;
yT+2   2;T+2 = 0:
Solving these equations, together with equation (22), yields
1;T = 0;
2;T =
1
(1   2)
T+1; (38)
2;T+1 =
 2
(1   2)
T+1 =  22;T :
Solution for optimal values of T+1 and T , requires solutions for the multipliers leading
up to and including the exit period. The equations for the output gap and ination for
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periods prior to exit (t  T + 1) can be written in matrix notation as
Zt = AZt 1   arnt 1; (39)
where
Zt =
"
yt
t
#
A =
"
1 + 

 

 

1

#
a =
"

0
#
:
A forward solution of the system to time T + 1 yields
Zt =
TX
k=t
A (k t+1)arnk + A
 (T t+1)ZT+1:
From equations (22) and (38),
ZT+1 = WT ;
where
W =
"
0 

 2
0 1   2
#
T =
"
1;T
2;T
#
: (40)
Substituting, we can write the solution for Zt as
Zt =
TX
k=t
A (k t+1)arnk + A
 (T t+1)WT : (41)
Write the equations for the multipliers as
t = Ct 1  DZt; (42)
where
t =
"
1;t
2;t
#
C =
"
1+




1
#
D =
"
 
0 1
#
: (43)
Solve t forward to time T , imposing that initial values (period 0) of both multipliers are
zero, to yield
T =  
TX
t=1
CT tDZt:
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Substituting from equation (41), we have an equation in T , given by
T =  
TX
t=1
CT tD
"
TX
k=t
A (k t+1)arnk + A
 (T t+1)WT
#
:
The solution for T is given by the value of T which solves
T =
"
0
2;T
#
(44)
=  
"
I +
TX
t=1
CT tDA (T t+1)W
# 1 TX
t=1
CT tD
"
TX
k=t
A (k t+1)arnk
#
:
Given T from equation (44), the solution for T+1 is given by equation (38) as (1   2)2;T :
10.2 Optimal Policy
10.2.1 After Exit ZLB
In matrix form, equations (18) and (21) can be written as"
yt+1
t+1
#
=
"
1 + 
2

  

 

1

#"
yt
t
#
;
with eigenvalues
 =
1 + 
2+


r
1 + 
2+

2
  4

2
;
implying that one stable and one unstable root. Decomposing the system using eigenvalues
and eigenvectors yields "
yt+1
t+1
#
= G	G 1
"
yt
t
#
;
with
G =
"
1  1

1  2

1 1
#
	 =
"
 1 0
0  2
#
G 1 =

 ( 2    1)
"
1  1  2

 1 1  1

#
;
and
 1 2 =
1

:
38
Pre-multiply by G 1 to yield
G 1
"
yt+1
t+1
#
= 	G 1
"
yt
t
#
"
y
0
t+1

0
t+1
#
= 	
"
y
0
t

0
t
#
:
These two di¤erential equations in y
0
t and 
0
t can be solved forward to yield
y
0
t =  
t (T+1)
1 y
0
T+1;

0
t =  
t (T+1)
2 
0
T+1:
Letting the unstable root be given by  1; the system is explosive unless y
0
T+1 = 0: There-
fore we set y
0
T+1 = 0: Transforming back into original variables yields"
yt
t
#
= G
"
 
t (T+1)
1 y
0
T+1
 
t (T+1)
2 
0
T+1
#
=
"
1  1

1  2

1 1
#"
0
 
t (T+1)
2 
0
T+1
#
:
The two equations become
yt =
1   2

 
t (T+1)
2 
0
T+1; (45)
t =  
t (T+1)
2 
0
T+1: (46)
We transform the 
0
T+1 back into original variables using"
y
0
T+1

0
T+1
#
= G 1
"
yT+1
T+1
#
=

 ( 2    1)
"
1  1  2

 1 1  1

#"
yT+1
T+1
#
:
Therefore,
y
0
T+1 =

 ( 2    1)

yT+1   1   2

T+1

;

0
T+1 =

 ( 2    1)

 yT+1 + 1   1

T+1

:
Setting y
0
T+1 = 0; as previously assumes, assures that the system does not explode. This
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yields a relation between exit-period values of output and ination given by
yT+1 =
1   2

T+1:
Substituting yields

0
T+1 =

 ( 2    1)

 

1   2

T+1

+
1   1

T+1

= T+1:
Substituting into equations (45) and (46), the solutions for output and ination for t 
T + 1 become
yt =

1   2


 
t (T+1)
2 T+1 (47)
t =  
t (T+1)
2 T+1 (48)
10.3 Optimal Policy under Uncertainty
Consider the solution for optimal monetary policy. We repeat the Lagrangian, but
reinstate expectations to yield
L1 = E1
1X
t=1
t

 1
2
 
2t + y
2
t
  1;t [ (it   rnt   t+1)  yt+1 + yt]  2;t [t   yt   t+1] + 3;tit ;
Since the constraints are forward-looking, some terms involve period t Lagrange multipli-
ers
 
1;t; 2;t

multiplied by period t+1 choice variables (t+1; yt+1) : Following Adam and
Billi (2006), relabel the Lagrange multipliers for these terms as 'i;t+1 (i = 1; 2) ; and add
transition equations 'i;t+1 = i;t: Collect all terms dated t and add '2;11+'1;1

1+y1


;
dening 'i;1 = 0: This delivers the following Lagrangrian.
L1 = E1
1X
t=1
t

 1
2
 
2t + y
2
t
  1;t [ (it   rnt ) + yt] + '1;t 1 (t + yt)  2;t [t   yt] + '2;tt
+
1X
t=1
t3;tit:
Note the Lagrangian is expressed as the innite sum of period t objective functions,
which depend only on variables in period t: At each t; the monetary authority has full
information on the period-t objective function and chooses t; yt; and it; to maximize that
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objective function, yielding rst order conditions
 2;t + '2;t   t +  1'1;t = 0;
 1;t +  1'1;t   yt + 2;t = 0;
 1;t + 3;t = 0 3;tit  0 3;t  0 it  0:
Substituting for the 'i;t yields equations (14) and (15). This implies that choices made in
period t do depend on lagged values, and therefore on past stochastic disturbances and
choices. However, note that these equations are purely backward-looking, containing no
expectations. The values of the multipliers do respond to past values and to stochastic
changes in contemporaneous output and ination.
We add the equations for output and ination, equations (1) and (2). Together with
equation (16), these ve equations constitute a system in the two multipliers, the nominal
interest rate, and in output and ination and their expectations.
Equation (39) combines equations (1) and (2) using matrix notation. A forward solu-
tion of equation (39), allowing the possibility of each of the three interest rate regimes,
for t  t^; yields
Zt = EtZt =
"
T1X
k=t
A (k t+1)arn1;k + A
 (T1 t+1)ZT1+1
#
$ (49)
+
"
T3X
k=t
A (k t+1)arn3;k + A
 (T3 t+1)ZT3+1
#
$
+
"
T2X
k=t
A (k t+1)arn2;k + A
 (T2 t+1)ZT2+1
#
(1  2$)
= R (1; t; T1)$ +R(2; t; T2)(1  2$) +R(3; t; T3)$
+A (T1 t+1)ZT1+1$ + A
 (T2 t+1)ZT2+1(1  2$) + A (T3 t+1)ZT3+1$:
where
R (i; t; Ti) =
TiX
k=t
A (k t+1)arni;k:
To obtain optimal values for exit times and ination upon exit, we continue to solve
the system. We center the system around the middle value for the shock and write the
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expression for Zt for t  t^ as
Zt = R(2; t; T2) + A
 (T2 t+1)ZT2+1
+$ [R(1; t; T1) +R(3; t; T3)  2R(2; t; T2)]
+$

A (T1 t+1)ZT1+1 + A
 (T3 t+1)ZT3+1   2A (T2 t+1)ZT2+1

:
There are three time paths of Z for Ti  t > t^; each conditional on the realization of the
interest rate regime. For i 2 (1; 2; 3) ; the time path for Z for t > t^ is given by
Zi;t = EtZi;t =
TiX
k=t
A (k t+1)arni;k + A
 (Ti t+1)ZTi+1
= R(i; t; Ti) + A
 (Ti t+1)ZTi+1:
From equations (22) and (38),
ZTi+1 = WTi;
with W given by equation (40) and the set of multipliers for each interest rate regime by
Ti =
"
1;Ti
2;Ti
#
:
Substituting, the values for the Z 0ts; for t  t^; are given by
Zt = R(2; t; T2) + A
 (T2 t+1)WT2
+$ [R(1; t; T1) +R(3; t; T3)  2R(2; t; T2)]
+$

A (T1 t+1)WT1 + A
 (T3 t+1)WT3   2A (T2 t+1)WT2

:
and for t > t^ are
Zi;t = EtZi;t = R(i; t; Ti) + A
 (Ti t+1)WTi :
Write the equations for the multipliers, using equation (42) and recognizing that there
is a set of equations for each interest rate regime, as
i;t = Ci;t 1  DZi;t;
42
where
i;t =
"
1i;t
2i;t
#
and C and D are given by equation (43) as before. Actual values of the multipliers are
chosen as a function of current and past values, so that we are solving for actual values of
the multipliers not expectations. Solve t forward to time T , imposing that initial values
(period 0) of both multipliers are zero, to yield
Ti =  
t^X
t=1
CTi tDZt  
TiX
t=t^+1
CTi tDZi;t:
We center the system around the middle value for the shock, yielding.
T2 =  
t^X
t=1
CT2 tDZt  
T2X
t=t^+1
CT2 tDZ2;t
T1 = C
T1 T2T2 +
T2X
t=t^+1
CT2 tDZ2;t  
T1X
t=t^+1
CT1 tDZ1;t
T3 = C
T3 T2T2 +
T2X
t=t^+1
CT2 tDZ2;t  
T3X
t=t^+1
CT3 tDZ3;t:
Substituting the Z 0s into T2 yields
T2 =  
T2X
t=1
CT2 tD

R(2; t; T2) + A
 (T2 t+1)WT2

 $
t^X
t=1
CT2 tD [R(1; t; T1) +R(3; t; T3)  2R(2; t; T2)]
 $
t^X
t=1
CT2 tD

A (T1 t+1)WT1 + A
 (T3 t+1)WT3   2A (T2 t+1)WT2

Solving for T2 as a function of di¤erences yields
T2 =  
"
I +
T2X
t=1
CT2 tDA (T2 t+1)W
# 1 " T2X
t=1
CT2 tDR(2; t; T2) + $
#
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where
 =  
t^X
t=1
CT2 tD [R(1; t; T1) +R(3; t; T3)  2R(2; t; T2)]
 
t^X
t=1
CT2 tD

A (T1 t+1)WT1 + A
 (T3 t+1)WT3   2A (T2 t+1)WT2

Solving for the multipliers associated with alternative interest rate paths (i 2 (1; 3)) as a
function of the multipliers associated with regime 2 yields
Ti = C
Ti T2T2 +
T2X
t=t^+1
CT2 tD

R(2; t; T2) + A
 (T2 t+1)WT2

 
TiX
t=t^+1
CTi tD

R(1; t; Ti) + A
 (Ti t+1)WTi

Solving for T1 yields
T1 =
24I + T1X
t=t^+1
CT1 tDA (T1 t+1)W
35 1

24CT1 T2  T2 + T2X
t=1
CT2 tD

R(2; t; T2) + A
 (T2 t+1)WT2
!  T1X
t=t^+1
CT1 tDR(1; t; T1)
35
We solve numerically for the values for Ti by rst solving for T2 ; setting  = 0:We
use this value to solve for T1 and T3 : Next, we use the values for T1 and T3 to solve
for :We resolve for T2 using the value for :We resolve for T1 and T3 using the new
value for T2 and continue to iterate the process until it converges.
22
22We o¤er no proof that convergence will occur, but in our examples, it occurs very quickly, in about
ve iterations.
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